Chińska Inicjatywa Pasa i Szlaku - perspektywa Republiki Federalnej Niemiec by Ciesielska-Klikowska, Joanna
Nr 12  ROCZNIK INTEGRACJI EUROPEJSKIEJ  2018
JOANNA CIESIElSKA-KlIKOwSKA
Uniwersytet Łódzki 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0938-5771
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative  
– the perspective of the Federal Republic of Germany
Introduction
The aim of the article is to show what attitude is expressed by the Federal Republic 
of Germany towards the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the level of state 
and non-state actors. It is important, since Germany is China’s key trading partner in 
the European Union, and at the same time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
the most valuable economic partner for Germany since 2017. It seems, therefore, that 
the perception of the Chinese strategy of international development and building eco-
nomic, political and cultural connections by the Germans is of the highest importance 
for understanding current German-Chinese relations and their consequences for the 
whole European Community.
The article is divided into an introductory part presenting the basis of the current 
cooperation between Germany and the PRC, followed by an explanation of the theo-
retical approach, and analyse of the German perception of the New Silk Road Initia-
tive1 in two different phases: first, in the “fluctuation phase” (2013–2016), and then in 
the current “phase of conflict and cooperation” (2016–), in which the model of political 
cooperation and the awareness of problem areas in bilateral relations developed. The 
starting point is the reference to the liberal theories in international relations which 
emphasize the role of state-society connections. They emphasize the importance of 
quality analysis tools in the global economy as an increasing number of interdependen-
cies, being the result of liberalization of various forms of international economic coop-
eration, and indicate the increase in the rank of non-governmental actors in the process 
of building bi- and multilateral relations (including mass media, interest groups and 
public opinion). The analysis is concluded with a short theoretical summary as well as 
political recommendations regarding German-Chinese relations.
The Belt and Road Initiative and the German-Chinese cooperation
The term “Silk Road” was created in the 19th century by the German traveler and 
geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen, who in this way defined the former trade route 
connecting China with the Middle East and Europe. However, the route lost its impor-
1 The terms New Silk Road and Belt and Road Initiative are used interchangeably in the text 
because in Polish literature on this subject it is assumed to use both names. In English and German 
literature, however, the term Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is most often used.
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tance after the discovery of the sea route to China in the 17th century and did not gain 
widespread recognition until the 20th century. Today, this ancient project connecting 
the Eurasian regions with the eastern and western parts of the world, stretching from 
Japan and the Korean Peninsula to the Mediterranean, gains a new dimension. As 
a concept of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) it was presented by the Chinese 
leader Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. In a speech de-
livered at Nazarbayev University, President Xi suggested that China and Central Asia 
should closely cooperate with each other to build a new dimension of the Silk Road. 
At this moment, Xi mentioned this strategic vision for the first time.
The idea of creating the New Silk Road was concretised by the president of the 
Peoples Republic of China in October 2013, when he proposed to build an agreement 
between China and the countries belonging to the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and presented the assumptions for the project of the Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR). Therefore, the plan was based on two pillars – the land and maritime 
Silk Road – and is nowadays considered as one of the largest infrastructural and in-
vestment ideas in history. It covers almost 70 countries, that are inhabited by 65% of 
the world’s population (4.4 billion people) and are responsible for 40% of global GDP 
in 2017 (Campbell, 2017). The project focuses on the expansion of the infrastructure 
network connecting China and the countries of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa 
and Europe in order to create favorable cooperation opportunities in the field of in-
frastructure and financial projects. And although its original name was One Belt One 
Road (OBOR), in subsequent years it was changed into the Belt and Road Initiative 
(Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2016).
Although the name has changed, the development strategy itself has not altered and 
since 2013 it has aroused great interest among European and Asian countries. It is not 
different in the Federal Republic of Germany, which – according to the analysis of the 
German think tank Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) – is considered as 
a country in which Chinese investments are the most intense (Wübbeke et al., 2016). 
This should not come as a surprise – Germany is currently the most important trading 
partner for China on the European continent, and German-Chinese relations remain 
one of the most complex relations between the PRC and the EU member states. The bi-
lateral dialogue covers 80 cooperation mechanisms complemented by intergovernmen-
tal consultations and bilateral talks on foreign and security policy. In the foreground, 
however, there is economic cooperation – already in 1978, the Federal Republic was in 
the fourth place among global and in the first place among European trade partners for 
China. Today, Germany is by far the most important trade partner for China in Europe. 
On the other hand, China is the most significant economic partner for Germany, both 
in Asia and around the world, because the PRC overtook the place of the United States 
and France, and took a leading position in trade relations with Germany. The level of 
German direct investment in China amounted to 69.5 billion EUR in 2015, while the 
level of Chinese direct investment increased six times since 2004 and amounted to 
2.2 billion EUR at the end of 2015. Meanwhile, bilateral trade in 2016 amounted to 
almost 170 billion EUR – 76 billion EUR came from German exports to China and 
almost 94 billion EUR from Chinese exports to Germany, and in 2017 Germany and 
China reached a turnover of 186.6 billion EUR (Hanemann, Huotari, 2017).
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Germany is considered to be the leading Chinese partner in Europe, distinguished 
by its key role in European politics and high technological innovation. Moreover the 
Chinese are aware that Germany is the undisputed leader of the European Union in 
both economic and political terms – especially after 2010, when the economic crisis 
in the countries of the European South began, and Germany was the only country that 
was able to take responsibility for the fate of the entire Eurozone. In fact, the Germans 
emerged as leaders of Euroland and the European Union as a whole, although Beijing 
was aware that they were not able to completely dominate the Community or trans-
form into a world power.
However, recent months of cooperation between China and Germany indicate that 
these countries are beginning to enter the phase of a difficult friendship. This is pri-
marily the result of the Chinese investment offensive in Germany. According to the 
EY consulting company, Chinese investors spent 12.2 billion EUR in 2017 for the 
purchase of German companies, what is an increase of 9% compared to 2016 and 
the largest ever expenditure in this area (EY, 2018, p. 8). Investors from the Middle 
Kingdom are especially fond of enterprises operating in the electromechanical and 
chemical industry, which causes critical opinions in the industry, since the representa-
tives of the German economy complained in recent years about the growing purchases 
of high-tech companies by Chinese entrepreneurs. However, scarcely taking over the 
leader in the field of robotics, Kuka, in 2016 as well as buying shares of the Krauss-
Maffei machine industry company and shares of the renewable energy concern EEW 
Energy (which, until now, was the most expensive acquisition of a German company 
by a Chinese investor – 1.4 billion EUR) (dpa, 2016), caused widespread discussion in 
German political and social circles (Popławski, 2017, pp. 4–5).
The takeovers of companies by Chinese investors show that Germany has difficul-
ties in assertively defending its interests in bilateral relations with China. The Federal 
Ministry of Economy and Energy admitted that China is on its way to become “the 
largest economy in the world and one of the largest geopolitical players in the 21st 
century,” and – as the Minister of State Matthias Machnig emphasized – “after two 
hundred years of national isolation and marginalization they want to get back to the 
top.” Thanks to the initiatives undertaken under the aegis of the Belt and Road, China 
wants to become an economic superpower (Dams, Grabitz, 2018). This expansion of 
the PRC may pose a threat to the high position of the European Union and some of 
its member states. Thus, the Germans are looking at the New Silk Road concept with 
great interest, but also with caution.
Taking all this into account the following points, which play a primary role in 
German-Chinese relations, should be taken into consideration:
favor of closer relations with China; –
China’s ability to exploit Germany for its particular interests; –
occurrence of conflicting areas with the interests of the EU and European countries  –
(also non-EU-states):
the meaning of 16+1 Initiative; –
the (very diverse) interests of all member states of the EU towards China. –
The lack of compliance of European countries with respect to the Asian super-
power’s activity was evident mainly in discussions in the European Union, including 
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granting China the market economy status, the threat of price dumping and the intro-
duction of EU anti-dumping duties on Chinese products (solar panels, Chinese steel), 
as well as on the territorial dispute on the South China Sea. The discussion reflected 
the general tendency of European countries to compete for Chinese capital and invest-
ments at the expense of formulating one European strategy towards Asia. Germany, as 
the most economically connected country with the PRC among the EU member states, 
often held an undecided position towards Beijing. Yet now, since China’s political and 
economic influence in Europe is growing, German politicians treat this development 
with concern and insist that the European Union should oppose the Chinese geopoliti-
cal strategy by creating its own projects for cooperation with the Middle Kingdom.
Theoretical approach
As it is well-argued by Brummer and Oppermann (Brummer, Oppermann, 2014, 
pp. 31–37) and pointed out by Harnisch (Harnisch, 2017), in the liberal analysis of 
foreign policy, the social interests in the distribution of values are transferred to the po-
litical system through assertive intermediary institutions (such as business associations 
and non-governmental organizations), and then, in accordance with the institutional 
participation opportunities (such as the number of institutional players represented 
by the political parties) to the governments of other states. Different priorities of po-
litical and economic values as well as assertiveness in government policy are applied 
(Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 513–553; Moravcsik, 2008, pp. 234–254) in order to explain 
the compatibility (complementarity) of these preferences with those of third countries. 
At the same time, it seems that idealistic and economic preferences, in particular their 
combination and prioritization, are a more credible explanation for the behaviors of 
the ruling elites than realism, power politics or geoeconomical approach (Kundnani, 
2011, pp. 31–45).
With regard to German-Chinese relations, it should be noted that the German per-
ception of cooperation with the PRC has so far been shaped by interest in mutual 
economic benefits and compliance with the international economic, commercial and 
investment order, but it is clear that the public opinion in the Federal Republic is begin-
ning to play an increasingly important role in shaping relations with China, emphasiz-
ing the importance of not only economic cooperation, but also focusing on the issues 
of human and civil rights, ecology and animal rights.
From the perspective of liberal theory, one can find various answers to the question 
of how dependently or independently of social preferences the federal government can 
shape the foreign policy of the country. Following the arguments of Thomas Risse-
Kappen (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 479–512), the democratization of foreign policy by 
social democrats in the late 1960s changed the way foreign policy was controlled by 
the head of the government, and since the unification of two German states – at least in 
the area of security policy – a strong society in Germany has had a significant impact 
on the decision-making process, including through elections, the creation of new party 
groups or demonstrations. The growing involvement of the Federal Republic in inter-
national organizations, in particular in the European Union, has also strengthened the 
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autonomy of executive power over other entities (legislative and judicial). On the other 
hand, according to Harnisch, these actors seek increasingly to hedge the executive 
through procedural and normative demands in order to assert their own position in the 
decision-making process and their policy preferences (Harnisch, 2009, pp. 455–468).
From a liberal point of view, the distribution of foreign policy decisions has the 
following correlation with society as a whole or part of it: the wider the distributional 
effect, the more important the attitude of the entire population for the decision. The 
more the organization of an interest group is affected by distributional effects, the more 
the group will try to influence the state’s policy.
Therefore, if we consider the German perspective on the BRI project and take into 
account the attitude of state and non-state actors in Germany (federal government, 
public opinion and mass media as well as interest groups) to the Belt and Road, two 
different phases can be distinguished:
1) in the first phase, which can be closed up in the years 2013–2016, mass media and 
public opinion – despite the considerable efforts of the Chinese government – re-
mained indifferent to the BRI. Meanwhile, the attitude of the federal government 
was in principle positive, although Chancellor Angela Merkel herself and the cabi-
net members were quite modest in their statements; this phase lasted until the series 
of takeovers of German strategic companies by the Chinese;
2) in the second phase, which begun after the acquisition (or the attempts to do so) of the 
strategic German companies in 2016 and lasts till today, the situation has changed: on 
the one hand, Chinese investments in Germany and in many countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe had (and still have) an impact on existing infrastructural concepts cre-
ated within the EU, which contributed to the implementation of the German initiative 
– the EU-China Connectivity Platform, a mechanism to avoid conflicts and develop 
a common position on bilateral issues using the synergy effect; on the other hand, the 
Federal Republic actively participated in the construction of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), signaling support for the development of the whole BRI. At 
the same time, the public opinion became more and more favourable in contacts with 
China, clearly indicating that the PRC is an attractive partner for Germany in both 
economic, political as well as cultural terms.
First phase: fluctuation
German public and social perception of the BRI project grew quite modestly. Only 
a few specialist publications (i.e. Godehardt, 2014, 2016; Rudolf, 2015, pp. 102–107) 
and press reports discussed the early phase of the project. The first important moment 
was the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Duisburg in March 2014, which high-
lighted the importance of existing infrastructure initiatives, mainly rail connections 
(Leipzig-Shenyang 2011 and Duisburg-Chongqing 2012) (Cnotka, 2014). The actual 
involvement of German companies remained, at this early stage, strictly limited to the 
logistics sector and did not attract interest to the general public.
Also in October 2014, when 600 representatives of China’s and European economy 
and politics gathered at the Hamburg summit, the Belt and Road Initiative was not yet 
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in the center of interest of the German public opinion. Not surprisingly, during the 
joint meeting of the Chinese embassy in Berlin with the representatives of the Federal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2016, the direct German concerns about the 
Chinese initiative were not discussed. The main issue was the compatibility of the BRI 
project with already existing economic communities – the Eurasian Economic Union 
and European Union.
An analysis of social attitudes in Germany towards China prepared at that time by 
Huawei Technologies, the largest Chinese company in Germany, showed a positive at-
titude of the Germans towards the People’s Republic of China, but divergent values for 
bilateral political and economic relations and attitudes of the general public, business 
entities and political elites. The PRC was then seen as a global and dynamic economic 
power, but perceived with caution (or even with fear) by about half of all German re-
spondents (49%), including 43% of politicians and 51% of economic decision makers. 
More than every other German (60%) believed that China’s influence on the German 
economy is large or very large, while 35% of them believed that both countries ben-
efit from technological cooperation. 58% of Germans also pointed out that domestic 
producers are being forced out of the market by Chinese producers. According to the 
survey results, China’s growth in German media in 2014 was perceived as an oppor-
tunity rather than a threat to the German economy, and the importance of China was 
identified with the huge sales market for German products (Huawei, 2014).2
Looking at the reception of the Chinese initiative of the New Silk Road through the 
prism of public opinion, a slightly bigger attention can be found after 2014. The first 
climax was reached in spring 2015, when discussions about the German participation 
in building of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a competitive institution for 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, flared up. AIIB was created in 
October 2014 and was headed by China. Its primary goal was to create incentives for 
investment growth in Asia, in transport as well as in energy, telecommunications or 
other infrastructure areas. Germany supported the creation of the bank with 4.5 billion 
USD and it was one of the largest shares among all member states (and the largest 
among countries outside the Asian region) (AIIB, 2015, pp. 30–31). It was a moment 
when in fact the Chinese initiative of the Belt and the Road began to be treated seri-
ously in Germany not only in political and business circles, but also in the media, and 
public opinion became more interested in reports published by think tanks and founda-
tions (Harnisch, 2017, p. 7).
The political nature of the analyzes in the first phase showed, above all, the chances 
for the German economy, but also the risks associated with the initiative. Questions 
were raised about the objectives of the Chinese concept – it was considered whether 
the goal is to build a far-reaching and coordinated infrastructure plan, or whether the 
BRI is a conglomerate of individual initiatives and activities, difficult to define pre-
2 Huawei Technologies, in cooperation with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
(GIGA) and TNS Emnid, has been conducting research every two years on how China is perceived 
by the Germans and vice versa. The following areas are explored: “Interests and knowledge,” “Policy 
and government,” “Economy and innovation” and “Society and culture,” and the analyzes are con-
ducted on the basis of empirical findings and key statistical data. Print media monitoring is also 
carried out.
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cisely by Chinese economic interests. There has been speculation that the plan is mo-
tivated by geopolitical considerations based on Chinese influence in many regions of 
the world and at the same time, that it strives to use the existing Chinese surplus in 
individual sectors on regional markets without paying attention to causing distortions 
in local economies. However, the German media and experts were also aware that the 
initiative could and should have a stabilizing effect in the underdeveloped provinces of 
China and neighboring countries (Gaspers, Lang, 2016, p. 28).
Considering the social preferences (defined as cautious or skeptical towards the 
initiative) and the official attitude of the federal government, one can notice an evident 
discrepancy. Angela Merkel’s cabinet supported the Belt and Road Initiative as early 
as October 2014, during the intergovernmental consultations organised in Berlin, and 
thus before the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade jointly published the action plan “Perspec-
tives and measures promoting the joint construction of the Silk Road and the Maritime 
Silk Road in the 21st century” (April 2015)3 (Beijing Rundschau, 2015). The German 
Chancellor also stressed her government’s position during her visit to Beijing in Octo-
ber 2015, when she praised the long-term strategic thinking of Chinese leaders in the 
development of the Silk Road initiative and called for a public debate on the impact 
of this infrastructure project, mentioning the need for intensive cooperation within the 
framework of the EU-China Connectivity Platform (Merkel, 2015).
Second phase: conflict and cooperation
Starting from 2016, a new economic dynamics was clearly visible, when Chinese 
investors launched an investment offensive in Europe, and in particular in Germany. 
The aforementioned takeover of shares in several strategic German enterprises meant 
that the political circles were becoming more and more skeptical about the steps taken 
by the Chinese partners. The problem of foreign acquisitions of German companies 
has been a source of concern for a long time. In 2016, Chinese companies announced 
or completed purchases of German companies with a total value of 11.3 billion EUR, 
and the involvement of Chinese government programs in these acquisitions, especially 
high-tech companies, caused criticism and extensive discussion on providing more 
access for German investors to the Chinese market. The effect of the shock associated 
primarily with the acquisition of Kuka Robotics by Midea, was the active lobbying of 
Germany for the introduction of control instruments for external entrepreneurs within 
the EU (Stanzel, 2017).
From that moment, the German government was determined to look critically at 
Chinese investments on the German market, which led to the failure of talks on the 
acquisition of Aixtron, a company manufacturing devices for the semiconductor indus-
3 After the third intergovernmental consultations the federal government stated: “Germany wel-
comes the further expansion of transcontinental trade routes between Europe and China and the 
economic axis initiative along the Silk Road. This opens new opportunities for German-Chinese 
and Euro-Chinese cooperation and development services contributing to stability and prosperity in 
Central Asia and in countries along the route” (Bundesregierung, 2014).
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try; and Ledvance, a company belonging to the Osram lighting group. It was then that 
German politicians also began to speak out loud about the danger of buying Chinese 
companies from the key sectors of the German economy, and thus enabling them to 
reach strategic information on the latest technologies (Reuters, 2016).
In addition, the rapid growth of Chinese direct investment was assessed in Berlin 
as the reason for opening up the discussions on the accessibility of the Chinese market 
(including solar, chemical and steel industries) for European companies (Deutsche 
Welle, 2017). The direct consequence of this more decisive policy was the European-
Chinese dispute during the Belt and Road Forum held in mid-May 2017 in Beijing 
(Pendrakowska, Bachulska, 2017).
Taking into account the German perspective, the real potential of conflict in the 
second phase is caused by the three distribution effects of the initiative for the EU and 
its eastern neighbours:
Chinese infrastructure loans give strength to political entities both in the EU and its  –
neighborhood (for instance through the 16+1 Initiative); their simultaneous conse-
quence is the fact that Chinese investment activity may, but does not have to, stand 
in direct conflict with European Union standards and the terms of joining the Com-
munity (Przychodniak, 2017);
Chinese credit-based infrastructure funds are quite attractive in some Central and  –
Eastern European countries (Serbia, Hungary, the Czech Republic), which results 
in competition with EU programs. However, in the long term, the indebtedness of 
the countries of the region means that the People’s Republic of China will have 
economic pressure to ensure that individual states follow the guidelines of China’s 
foreign policy (Makocki, 2017);
Chinese investments cause new political and economic distribution conflicts within  –
the European Union. Growing dominance of Chinese investments in Europe poses 
EU the challenge of establishing EU mechanisms to strengthen the security sys-
tem, especially in relation to cyber security and counterintelligence, and European 
regulations concerning Chinese investments. Meanwhile, during European Coun-
cil meetings, the pressure of EU member states to resist solutions unfavorable for 
China, for instance in relation to creating a European investment control system, 
a key project for Chancellor Merkel, which was rejected in June 2017 due to pres-
sure from Greece and the Czech Republic, is noticeable (Müller, 2018).
Considering the public opinion and media reports, the attitude of Germans to-
wards China’s economic power in the second phase is less alarming than it was 
before 2016. Comparing the results of the Huawei Technologies study conducted 
among German citizens as well as politicians and economic decision-makers, it can 
be stated that only 44% of the total population (compared to 49% in 2014) empha-
sizes reservations about China, while among politicians and entrepreneurs the fear 
of Chinese economic power dropped by about 1/3 (in the case of politicians in 2014 
it was 43%, and in 2016 – 35%, while among businessmen in 2014 – 51%, and in 
2016 – 34%). The survey showed that stereotypes are still strong in both societies 
– when asked about spontaneous associations, Chinese participants of the study an-
swered that they associate Germans with “strong economy, automotive industry and 
German features,” while thinking about China, many Germans indicated that this 
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country provokes associations such as “economic strength, demographic growth and 
Chinese food” (Huawei, 2016).
It should be noted that the better perception of the BRI project by the Germans in 
the second phase (despite the undoubted challenges of selling shares of key companies) 
was related to increased access to scientific publications, a wide press offer, frequent 
media reports and political discussions connected with Chinese initiative and activity 
in Europe and in the world. After 2015, there were numerous specialist publications in 
German and English on various aspects of the BRI that presented a broad spectrum of 
Chinese foreign policy, including the concept of President Xi Jinping, Prime Minister 
Li Keqiang, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other representatives of Chinese political 
life (Schüller, Schüler-Zhou, 2015; Stanzel, 2016; van der Putten et al., 2016; Ghiasy, 
Zhou, 2017; Pepe, 2017; Makocki, 2017; Schiek, 2017).
With the publication of the Joint Action Plan by the National Development and 
Reform Commission in spring 2015, the Belt and Road Initiative has entered its imple-
mentation phase. In addition to infrastructure changes, the BRI was supposed to include 
coordination of intergovernmental policy and undertake steps to increase trade and 
promote investment as well as people-to-people contacts (Miller, 2017). The Federal 
Association of German Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), the 
largest and most important association of the German economy, welcomed the initia-
tive very warmly from the beginning. The result of opening to China became the estab-
lishment of the representative office by BDI in Beijing in mid-2017, which – according 
to the statement of the union – is able to not only take care of existing business contacts 
and seek new ones, but also to explain the emerging disputable situations (BDI, 2017). 
The German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handel-
skammertag, DIHK) has similar positive opinions on the development of the German 
economy in China, and the chairman of the Munich Institute of Economic Research 
(ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Clemens Fuest, claims that 
cooperation with the Chinese should be used by Germany as a lever to push for better 
investment conditions in the Middle Kingdom (Deutsche Welle, 2018).
Undoubtedly, Belt and Road is a project that offers completely new business op-
portunities, but it is interesting mainly for large corporations and companies classified 
as global players. For small and medium enterprises, it is often a challenge over and 
above strength. This is the reason why until now only a few German companies and 
institutions have taken seriously the implementation of the New Silk Road. Among 
them is Deutsche Bank, which has invested 3 billion EUR in AIIB; or German railways 
(Deutsche Bahn), which signed a contract to expand cooperation with Chinese state 
airlines in 2016. Also German transhipment centers such as Hamburg or Duisburg 
(DuisPort) expect new business opportunities due to the expansion of connections with 
sea and land routes created by the BRI.
However, research institutes and representatives of civil society argue that Ger-
man-Chinese cooperation, even in the third markets (in Asia and Africa) is or will be 
problematic, because until now the initiative was not sufficiently balanced and did 
not have multilateral nature, so it will most likely lose acceptance in the destination 
countries. It is indicated that there are no knowledge exchange platforms that would 
allow the weaker countries to identify appropriate solutions, as well as set common 
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standards for tendering and financing projects and rules for their links to existing strat-
egies (Wolff, 2017).
In fact, in the second phase there is a mixed orientation of social preferences to-
wards the Belt and Rod Initiative. Business-related institutes and companies emphasize 
the perspectives that this concept opens (especially in the Eurasian area) to German 
high-tech companies, specialist construction and logistics companies, and indicate 
broad sales opportunities in the European and Asian region. At the same time, they 
call for the opening of the EU internal market for Chinese investments to be condition-
al on the equal market opportunities for European companies in China because they 
have been insufficiently implemented so far, despite China’s membership in the World 
Trade Organization (Majchrowska, 2014, pp. 206–215). Civil society organizations 
and research institutes criticize the insufficient participation of civic actors in the BRI 
target countries, which weakens the social, economic and environmental sustainability 
of this initiative.
Taking into account the position of the federal government towards the Belt and 
Road project, in the second phase, the Merkel’s cabinet maintains its generally positive 
attitude towards the BRI and promotes the construction of the Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank – as the largest shareholder outside Asia, the Federal Republic supports 
the goals of sustainable development, which should be achieved by the bank through 
financing infrastructure and other production sectors. Representatives of the govern-
ment are also in favor of linking the existing regional organizations and initiatives (e.g. 
BRI and Eurasian Economic Union) to achieve synergy in financing the infrastructural 
connection projects (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017a).
The federal government sees opportunities to cooperate with China primarily 
through partnership in the third countries. Large infrastructure projects require not 
only specialist knowledge that German companies have at their disposal, but also pro-
fessional and independent risk assessment as well as active cooperation with existing 
institutions and financial organizations.
However, from the point of view of the federal government, over the past two 
years, it has become increasingly clear that Beijing is using its progressive invest-
ment activities not only in economic struggle, but also to exert political pressure 
and influence decisions on the EU member states as well as these aspiring to EU 
membership. This was particularly evident in the following cases: in summer 2016 
Greece, Hungary and Croatia opposed the EU’s common position calling on the 
Chinese government to comply with the decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration on Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea (Gotev, 2016); in June 
2017, a coalition of EU member states that has close investment relations with China 
(Greece, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Malta and Sweden) sought to prevent the 
introduction of stricter EU controls on foreign direct investment in Europe; in the 
same month Greece prevented the development of a common EU position on human 
rights violations in China4 (Müller, 2018).
4 Greece is increasingly supporting Chinese trade and investment because it faces the pressure 
of international creditors and, at the same time, can count on less support from the usual allies in 
Europe. In addition, China’s largest shipping company, China COSCO Shipping, bought the majority 
stake in the Greek port of Piraeus in 2016.
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The reaction of the federal government to these events left little scope for inter-
pretation. Germany’s main concerns regard firstly China’s efforts to break the unity 
of the Eurozone, and secondly, the Chinese expectations of a possible disintegration 
of the Community, which will change the international political situation and strength-
en the position of the PRC (Pepe, 2017). These fears were the main topic of a widely 
discussed statement of Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, who during the conference of 
French ambassadors in Paris on 30th August 2017 said that EU members must conduct 
a common foreign policy towards China, otherwise “China will succeed in dividing 
Europe” (Gabriel, 2017). Gabriel argued that Beijing’s cooperation with selected coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the Belt and Road Initiative is a threat to 
EU’s unity and should therefore be countered. Referring to the multilateral cooperation 
agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the CEE countries within the 
16+1 format, the German politician warned about China’s great influence on European 
Union’s policy and argued that the New Silk Road project was “a huge geopolitical, 
cultural, economic and undoubtedly also a military challenge” and it cannot be com-
pared with the standards and values represented by Berlin and Brussels, and therefore 
should be counteracted (Gabriel, 2017).
The BRI is to be the next step of the PRC towards economic integration with the 
European Union, because the existing export and investment economy model in China 
is running out, and the New Silk Road may be an ideal tool for restructuring the current 
development formula. Wanting to find an outlet for surplus production, China is trying 
to implement numerous foreign investments, which will transfer into a new political 
dimension of China’s global position. On the other hand, because it is still difficult 
to determine the ultimate goal of the Chinese project, German government circles 
indicate that the issues of transparency of cooperation and sustainable development 
should be a key to the success of the initiative. Department of Asia and the Pacific 
in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in May 2017, emphasizes that 
Germany is determined to cooperate with other partners in implementing the New Silk 
Road project, but at the same time counts on the synergy effect between the EU and 
China. However, this objective cannot be achieved at all costs, because the EU is based 
on transparent rules and cannot afford to neglect issues such as environmental protec-
tion, health and safety or social standards (OAV, Ebbighausen, 2017). According to 
the approach of German politicians, the idea of BRI will be valuable when all projects 
implemented within its framework will serve a sustainable development strategy that 
takes into account important economic and social aspects.
Thus, the perception of growing Chinese power is becoming more and more skeptical 
in the Federal Republic – it was so throughout the 2017, when the Vice-Chancellor and 
Foreign Minister S. Gabriel emphasized the need to create a common EU foreign policy 
towards China in his August-speech, what he also highlighted in the exposé entitled “Eu-
rope in an uncomfortable world” (Europa in einer unbequemeren Welt), presented on 
5th December 2017, when he said that the Belt and Road Initiative is a geostrategic idea 
that makes China enforce its vision of international order (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017b). At 
the same time, Chancellor A. Merkel became more and more distrustful, what was exem-
plified by her strong support for the amendment of the Federal Trade Regulation in July 
2017, which hinders the acquisition of German companies operating in the know-how 
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sector by foreign enterprises (BMWi, 2017), as well as her critical opinions expressed on 
the 16+1 project, which is perceived in Berlin as a way of securing more Chinese invest-
ments in Europe and its wider neighborhood (Escritt, 2018).
This position did not change when, in March 2018, Angela Merkel took up the role 
of the German head of government for the fourth time. Likewise, the new Foreign 
Minister, Heiko Maas, believes that in troubled times Germany must assume greater 
responsibility for international politics, although he emphasizes that it should not over-
estimate its capabilities. Regarding China, Maas draws attention to the dialogue on 
human rights – as the Minister of Justice in the previous government, Maas has repeat-
edly emphasized the issue of non-respect of personal freedoms in China, hence it may 
be assumed that also as the head of diplomacy he will put a special emphasis on the is-
sue of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsdialog), which was introduced in German-Chinese 
relations in 2000. Although during the first meeting of the German Minister of Foreign 
Affairs with the head of the Chinese diplomacy Wang Yi in Berlin on 31st May 2018, 
both politicians discussed primarily the current international situation and economic 
affairs (i.a. the Korean Peninsula, Iran’s issue, the protectionist policy of President 
D. Trump) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018).
Also during the last, eleventh since taking the Chancellor’s office, Merkel’s visit to 
China (24–25th May 2018), the German head of government declared that both countries 
should intensify the cooperation at all levels and work on a “multilateral global system” 
based on supporting global free trade and seeking international solutions in crisis situa-
tions. During the meeting with President Xi, Merkel insisted on guaranteeing equal mar-
ket access for German companies in China and emphasized that bilateral talks are used 
to identify problems and possibilities of solving them in areas such as technical develop-
ment or cooperation in the field of finance and insurance (Bundesregierung, 2018).
To recapitulate, German foreign policy in the second phase indicates the follow-
ing model: the increase of direct influence of the Chinese initiative on the preferences 
of many political, economic and civil society entities leads to a much stronger po-
litical reaction – Germany’s accession to AIIB meant compatibility with the common 
German-Chinese economic and development policy interests in third countries (espe-
cially in Asia and Europe), while the demand for a single European policy towards the 
PRC by the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and the critical reaction of Chancellor 
Merkel, meant a lack of consensus on the political concepts presented by Berlin and 
Beijing, and different perception of shaping and coordinating EU internal policy. At 
the same time, with the establishment of the EU-China Connectivity Platform and with 
the conduction of in-depth intergovernmental dialogue, it becomes clear from a liberal 
point of view that both partners try to bring the process of shaping interests closer to-
gether through institutionalized policy coordination.
Conclusion
The analysis implies that Germany – through close cooperation with the PRC 
– wants to strive to maximize the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative based on the 
synergy effect. It is also the declared position of China, which describes the BRI as an 
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opportunity to build prosperity in Asia, the Middle East and Europe in accordance with 
the “win-win” principle.
For this purpose, Berlin can pursue the objectives of its international policy to-
wards Beijing on several levels:
1) by supporting the involvement of German and European small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the process of developing the Belt and Road project, which could 
lead to a decrease in distrust in bi- and multilateral cooperation;
2) by coordinating the establishment of a committee regulating cross-border coopera-
tion between China and the European Union and piloting projects aimed at creat-
ing a tripartite shareholding model (PRC, EU, non-EU-States) – in this way, an 
advanced German-Chinese cooperation could be implemented on the third-party 
markets;
3) by strengthening the dialogue within the EU-China Connectivity Platform and en-
gaging in the emergence of a new form of cooperation, connecting both countries 
of the region, China and EU institutions, and supporting the creation of tripartite 
investment opportunities in selected areas.
Taking into account the perspective of the liberal theory in foreign policy, it should 
be noted that Germany’s reaction to the New Silk Road cannot be adequately explained 
by power politics or the geo-economic approach. On the contrary, German political 
behavior especially in the second phase shows a dependence on social preferences, 
media reports and substantive analyses prepared by non-state actors.
For this reason, the liberal interpretation of Germany’s ambivalent response is 
more convincing and empirically more credible than the political alternatives pre-
sented by realist theories – no other non-Asian country supported the construction of 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank so strongly as Germany did, and no other 
European Union’s country criticized the Chinese influence for internal voting proc-
esses in the Community as clearly as the Federal Republic. Conflicts between states 
are, from a liberal perspective, inevitable and they occur everywhere where the in-
compatibility of interests is so great that even institutionalized policy coordination 
– even through the EU-China Connectivity Platform – is not able to mitigate them. 
To avoid these conflicts, significant structural changes would have to be made on 
both sides, which would include the evolution of the Chinese investment approach in 
Europe (abandoning the dominant position of state-owned enterprises in business), 
but also the transformation of German interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Such 
changes are difficult to make in the near future, what leads to the conclusion that 
the ambivalent attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany will be continued and 
possibly strengthened or weakened, depending on political and social needs, require-
ments and expectations.
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Summary
The People’s Republic of China has achieved the position of one of the major players in the in-
ternational arena and is boldly pursuing the policy of foreign expansion. Its basic instrument is the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which in recent years has been one of the most important projects 
of the Chinese authorities, assuming the intensification of economic cooperation and cultural ex-
change of countries along the New Silk Road. Germany, the EU leading state and China’s crucial 
partner in Europe, is a strong supporter of the Belt and Road Initiative. However, as the concept 
of BRI involves the member states of the European Union, it also requires a strong reaction from 
the Community. And although the EU’s relations with the PRC are in the economic interest of all 
its member states, they have not been without complications in recent years.
The paper examines the importance of societal preferences and attitudes of the Federal Re-
public of Germany towards the Belt and Road Initiative since 2013 by using the liberal explana-
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tory approach. The aim of the paper is to analyse the German response to the Silk Road project 
in two distinct phases: the first one (2013–2016) and the second phase (2016–). Moreover the 
article will try to identify the problems that exist in relations between the European Union and 
China, with particular emphasis on the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. A short theoretical conclusion as well as political recommenda-
tions conclude the analysis.
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Chińska Inicjatywa Pasa i Szlaku – perspektywa Republiki Federalnej Niemiec 
 
Streszczenie
Chińska Republika Ludowa osiągnęła pozycję jednego z głównych graczy na arenie mię-
dzynarodowej i odważnie realizuje politykę ekspansji zagranicznej. Jej podstawowym instru-
mentem jest inicjatywa Pasa i Szlaku (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI), która w ostatnich latach 
jest jednym z najważniejszych projektów chińskich władz, zakładającym zintensyfikowanie 
współpracy gospodarczej i wymianę kulturalną krajów wzdłuż Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku. 
Niemcy, czołowe państwo UE i kluczowy partner Chin w Europie, są silnym zwolennikiem 
inicjatywy BRI. Ponieważ jednak koncepcja ta obejmuje państwa członkowskie Unii Europej-
skiej, wymaga również silnej reakcji ze strony Wspólnoty. I chociaż stosunki UE z ChRL leżą 
w interesie gospodarczym wszystkich jej państw członkowskich, w ostatnich latach nie były 
one wolne od komplikacji.
Artykuł analizuje znaczenie społecznego postrzegania i postaw aktorów państwowych Re-
publiki Federalnej Niemiec wobec projektu Pasa i Szlaku od 2013 r., stosując liberalne podej-
ście wyjaśniające. Celem artykułu jest przeanalizowanie reakcji Niemiec na inicjatywę Nowego 
Jedwabnego Szlaku w dwóch różnych fazach: pierwszej (2013–2016) i drugiej fazie (2016–), 
w której wypracowano model współpracy i świadomość występujących konfliktów. Ponadto ar-
tykuł próbuje zidentyfikować problemy istniejące w stosunkach między Unią Europejską a Chi-
nami, ze szczególnym naciskiem na stosunki między Chińską Republiką Ludową a Republiką 
Federalną Niemiec. Analizę kończą krótki wniosek teoretyczny oraz rekomendacje polityczne.
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